Abstract: We study international subcontracting in the asset management industry. We document that in companies that manage both funds on behalf of other companies (outsourced funds) and own funds (inhouse funds), the inhouse funds outperform outsourced by 1.14% annually or by 50%-75% of their expense ratio. We explain this difference in performance as outsourced funds subsidizing inhouse funds. We justify it as an implicit form of incentive-based compensation accepted by the contractor management company that incentivizes the subcontractor to deliver higher performance on the managed funds. As contract theory posits, we find that subsidization makes the subcontractor deliver higher performance; subsidization is lower the more difficult it is for the principal to observe the agent -i.e., the the fund family and the management company are located in different countries -; subsidization is negatively related to the degree of exclusivity in the familysubcontractor relationship; subsidization is positively related to the bargaining power of the management company -i.e., its ability to independently market and distribute its funds to investors. All these results are consistent with an equilibrium view in which subsidization is a part of the incentive compensation of the agent.
Introduction
The complexity of international investment and the need for specialized local information makes outsourcing of portfolio management an important part of the financial services industry. Indeed, outsourcing to local managers may entail benefits in terms of privileged access to information or better connections to authorities. Many financial companies offering international funds to their investors find it optimal to delegate the actual portfolio management of such funds to third parties who possess more expertise in local markets. For example, even if a fund specializing in international investment is marketed and sold by an American firm to American investors, the actual trading decisions are made by a contracted manager located in another country, often close to the investment focus of the fund. 1 In 2008, 24% of all the world mutual funds were managed by subcontractor firms.
Outsourcing of asset management may create an array of agency problems ranging from a simple lack of effort on the part of the agent to an unfair treatment of different clients. The contractor is often affiliated with a financial conglomerate that not only manages funds on behalf of other families but also markets its own brand of funds. 2 In such cases conflicts of interest may arise that would prompt the management company to give preferential treatment to one group of funds over the other. The unfair treatment can take form of uneven manager effort or skill allocation, preferential access to investment opportunities, or even direct wealth transfer through cross-trading of stocks. However, one important feature of subcontracting is that the principals -i.e., likely to be big fund families with relevant bargaining power are aware of the agency issues and can condition their strategies on the agents' expected actions. As a result, the observed allocation of effort and value by the agent -the subcontractor -is an equilibrium outcome that likely reflects a mutually beneficial arrangement between the principal and the agent. Such arrangements have been studied in the context of contract theory (e.g., (Grossman & Hart, 1986) , (Hart & Moore, 1990) , (Hart, 1995) ) with applications to corporate finance ( (Baker, et al., 1988) , (Dow & Raposo, 2005) ).
In this paper, we study this issue using a novel approach that exploits contract theory to explain the relationship between the outsourcing company and the subcontractor in terms of a flexible arrangement in which the profit sharing scheme allows the subcontractor to use the relationship to help its own inhouse funds. We have unique information on international outsourcing relationships in open-end funds that allow us to identify both the mutual fund family -i.e., the principal -who markets funds to investors as well as the management company -i.e., the agent -who is directly responsible for portfolio management and investment decisions. This identification allows us to 3 perform a series of tests of the principal-agent theory in the context of international asset management. In particular, for the same management company (the agent) we study the differential treatment of funds that represent the company's own brand and funds that this company manages on behalf of other fund families.
We begin by providing strong evidence that inhouse funds perform better than their otherwise similar outsourced counterparts. In companies managing both types of funds, the outsourced funds underperform inhouse funds by 9.5 bp (7.1 bp) per month as measured by raw return (4-factor alpha).
This effect translates into an annualized performance differential of 1.14% (0.85%) or about 50%-75% of the annual fund expense ratio. We confirm this result by performing a matching sample analysis where for every inhouse fund we compare its performance to that of affiliated and unaffiliated outsourced funds. The difference in performance between the affiliated inhouse and outsourced funds is 10.1 bp (6.6 bp) greater than that between the unaffiliated funds. We refer to this effect as performance differential attributable to or induced by cross-subsidization or simply "the subsidization effect". These results are robustly significant at 1% and survive multiple controls and fixed effects specifications.
Traditionally, the prevalence of agency problems in the mutual fund industry has been blamed on individual investors' irrationality and their inability to recognize the value-destructive behavior of money managers. However, in the mutual fund outsourcing relationship, principals are not individual investors but professional mutual fund families possessing enough sophistication to select the best contractors. 4 This fact is in apparent conflict with our main finding and suggests the existence of an equilibrium in which the principal is fully aware and willing to participate, accepting the inferior treatment of their funds.
We argue that, while surprising, the observed subsidization effect is in line with the principal-agent context in which superior performance of inhouse funds serves as an incentive compensation mechanism. We rely on the standard principal-agent framework (e.g., (McAfee & McMillan, 1986) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987) , (Kawasaki & McMillan, 1987) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) ) and use it as a template to study asset management outsourcing in an international setting. What appears to be an unfair treatment of the two classes of funds is, in fact, an implicitly accepted profit sharing arrangement between the principal and the agent. We test this equilibrium view by considering a number of hypotheses that are based on observable parameters of the principal-agent relationship.
First, the compensation the principal is willing to cede to the agent should be positively related to the value the agent is able to create. The principal should be more willing to share profits if the agent's ability to generate performance is high. Accordingly, if subsidization is indeed a way of compensating subcontractors, we should observe a positive relationship between the subsidization effect and the agent's overall performance, measured as the value-weighted return of all the funds run by the management company. This will be our first hypothesis.
Second, the agent's compensation should decrease with the inability of the principal to evaluate the performance of the agent relative to his best effort. In the principal-agent framework, the variable compensation of the agent is lower, the noisier the signal about his effort. We rely on the (geographical) distance between the principal and the agent as a proxy for the principal's inability to observe the agent's effort. For example, fund families located in the U.S. will find it difficult to assess the performance of the Indian subcontractor since they cannot observe his investment opportunity set and therefore cannot determine whether a particular investment decision was optimal in the context of the available options. Therefore, our second hypothesis predicts that the subsidization effect should be lower the more distant the subcontractor is from the principal.
Third, we consider an extension of the standard model to account for multiple tasks and multiple principals (e.g., (Martimort, 1996) , (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998) ). In the presence of multiple principals, the percentage of activity that the principal allows an agent to carry out for the other principals in potentially competing tasks is related to the agent's compensation. The higher the agent's compensation, the less the principal will be concerned that the agent shirks and treats his other clients more favorably. Consequently, exclusivity of partnership and variable compensation are likely substitute incentive mechanisms. We summarize this reasoning in our third hypothesis which predicts a negative relationship between the subsidization effect and the degree of exclusivity in the principalagent relationship -i.e., whether the principal is the sole (or the biggest) customer of the agent or is just one of many.
Finally, we consider conditions that make the subsidization-based mechanism of profit sharing particularly effective. A management company with a stronger distribution channel -affiliated with a bank -has a higher incentive to grow its own funds and engage in subsidization. In contrast, companies without such channel are more dependent on the outsourced funds where distribution and marketing are carried out by the principal fund family. Therefore we expect that management companies affiliated with a bank -an effective channel to sell funds to retail clients -are more likely to engage in subsidization.
We test our hypotheses by focusing on a dataset of international mutual funds over the period from 2001 to 2008. We confirm our first hypothesis by documenting a strong positive relationship between the TNA-weighted average of the management company's funds -a proxy for the agent's raw ability to create value -and the average performance gap between the inhouse and outsourced funds run by that company -a proxy for subsidization. When the overall return of the management company increases by 1%, the difference in returns between the inhouse and outsourced funds grows by approximately 10 bp. Both inhouse and outsourced funds benefit when the subcontractor creates more overall value. Not only is the difference in performance between the two fund classes larger the higher the average performance of the company, but also outsourced funds experience a better performance the higher the returns of the affiliated inhouse funds, and vice versa.
Next, we link subsidization to a variable which identifies whether the principal and the agent are located in the same country. We find that the subsidization effect is indeed weaker in cross-border relationships: where the outsourcing company and the subcontractor operate in different countries, the inhouse-outsourced performance difference attributable to subsidization is only 3.8 bp (1.9 bp) per month if measured by raw return (4-factor alpha) while in the same-country pairs it increases to 12.2 bp (7.9 bp). Importantly, this result helps us reject the competing hypothesis that relates subsidization to the inability of the principal to enforce discipline on a far-away agent.
Then, we study the connection between subsidization and the exclusivity of the principal-agent relationship. We find that subsidization in companies with below-median exclusivity is about 50%
higher than in companies with above-median exclusivity. For the former category, the subsidization effect is about 13.6 bp (8.7 bp) per month as measured by raw return (4-factor alpha) while for the latter it drops to 6.3 bp (4.1 bp). These results are in line with the reasoning that exclusivity and compensation are substitute mechanisms to ensure proper effort on the part of the agent. In other words, where the principal is the sole biggest client of the agent, the role of subsidization in establishing the right incentives is weaker.
Next, we investigate how subsidization varies when management companies have access to a distribution network alternative to that of the principal. We document that, when the management company is affiliated with a commercial bank, the subsidization effect is about 12 bp a month in terms of 4-factor alpha whereas it is statistically insignificant when the management company has no bank affiliation. Bank affiliation might therefore proxy for the management companies' ability to grow their own brand of funds in order to maximize future fee income without having to build a distribution network.
Also, we investigate how the subsidization effect depends on the relative weights of the inhouse and outsourced assets in the management company's custody. We find that in companies with a below-median ratio of outsourced to inhouse TNA, the performance difference attributable to subsidization is about 6 bp (0 bp) in terms of monthly raw return (4-factor alpha). In companies with an above-median ratio of outsourced to inhouse TNA this difference is about 6.8 bp (13.6 bp) larger, totaling 12.8 bp (13.6 bp) per month or 1.54% (1.63%) per year. This suggests that sufficient amount of outsourced capital is essential to ensure the necessary benefits for the inhouse funds.
Finally, we examine potential channels through which subsidization takes place. We focus on cross-trading between affiliated funds. We find that inhouse funds trade disproportionately more with 6 the affiliated outsourced funds (twice as much) than with the rest of the market. Moreover, this trading activity increases in the fraction of the outsourced funds in the family as well as at the time when the inhouse fund is in distress -i.e. faces steep outflows in excess of 5% of its TNA.
Correspondingly, the effect of distress on fund performance is strongly mitigated if the management company has a large fraction of outsourced funds. While an average inhouse fund from a company with a below-median outsourced fraction experiences a decline of 56 bp (38 bp) in raw return (4-factor alpha) during the month of distress, a similar fund from a company with an above-median outsourced fraction fares much better, declining by only 32 bp in terms of raw return and 5 bp in terms of 4-factor alpha. These results suggest a liquidity-based channel of performance transfer, namely that managers use outsourced funds as buying counterparties when affiliated inhouse funds need to liquidate positions quickly.
This study contributes to several strands of the finance and economics literature. First, we relate to the literature on offshoring and outsourcing (e.g., (Antras, 2003) , (Antras, 2005) , (Antras & Helpman, 2004) , (Grossman & Helpman, 2005) , (Feenstra & Hanson, 2005) ). We show that the subsidization effect does not detract from the benefits of outsourcing but constitutes a rational arrangement sustainable in equilibrium.
More specifically, we relate to the literature on outsourcing in financial markets. (Guercio, et al., 2010 ) study the economics of outsourcing by testing the incentives for outsourcing based on competition and demand. (Chen, et al., 2010) show that funds managed externally significantly underperform those run internally and explain this effect by contractual externalities and firm boundaries that make it difficult to extract performance from an outsourcing relationship. In contrast,
we focus on the perspective of the agent who faces a conflict of interest by managing both its own and outsourced funds and the preferential treatment that inhouse funds receive. We show that geographical separation of the principal and the agent does not cause the agent to appropriate a bigger share of the profits. Instead, we argue that subsidization should be regarded not as a theft from unaware asset managers but rather as part of the optimal compensation package for the subcontractor.
This reasoning differentiates this study from the traditional literature on subsidization in the mutual fund industry (e.g., (Gaspar, et al., 2006) ). This assumes that subsidization occurs at the expense of irrational individual retail investors. In our setting, it is unlikely that major international financial services firms are irrational and allow their funds to be treated unfairly. Rather, we explain the purported subsidization effect in terms of the optimal contractual relationship. As such, we directly relate to the principal-agent literature (e.g., (McAfee & McMillan, 1986) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987) , (Kawasaki & McMillan, 1987) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) ) by applying the principal-agent framework to describe outsourcing in the asset management market.
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Finally, we contribute to the literature in international finance (e.g., (Kang & Stulz, 1997) , (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001) , (Froot, et al., 2001) , (Froot & Ramadorai, 2008) ). We complement this literature by studying the international dimension of portfolio management as a function of specific information characteristics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II we develop testable hypotheses based on theoretical predictions of the principal-agent framework. In Section III we explain the dataset construction and define key variables. In Section IV we document and quantify the subsidization effect. In Section V we test our hypotheses and perform analysis of subsidization conditional on geographical boundaries and partnership exclusivity. In Section VI we study channels of performance transfer. A brief conclusion follows.
II. Hypotheses
In this section, we lay out our main hypotheses. We argue that international fund families tolerate that their funds are used to subsidize the funds of the subcontractors as a way of compensating the subcontractors in a profit sharing arrangement. In other words, subsidization is is a sort of variable compensation paid by the principal to the agent that allows the agent to appropriate a part of the value he generates.
This intuition rests on the premise that both the management company -the agent -and the fund family -the principal -derive utility from this arrangement. The agent derives significant value from boosting the performance of its own (inhouse) funds. Indeed, it appropriates all the fees from managing inhouse funds while in the subcontracting relationship the fees are shared. Given that performance is the chief mechanism to attract investors and maximize flows into the fund, agents, interested in expanding their asset base and developing their own brand of funds, will therefore jump on the opportunity provided by the use of the outsourced funds to help its own in-house.
From the principal's perspective, subsidization represents a flexible and cheap compensation mechanism that allows structuring the reward as a function of performance. Indeed, while the principal could, in theory, offer the agent a larger share of the expense ratio on the outsourced funds, this would be very more costly and less effective as these fees do not reward the performance directly but instead allow the agent to appropriate part of the assets the family brings into the relationship.
Furthermore, variable compensation via subsidization could even be preferable to a contractual performance-based fee.
First, subsidization is a very flexible arrangement. The agent can resort to subsidization at times when its expected benefits are particularly high. For example, consider an inhouse fund that faces steep outflows and needs to liquidate its positions quickly. Outsourced funds can step in as liquidity providers and allow the distressed fund to liquidate without incurring large discounts. To the extent 8 that the flows of inhouse and outsourced funds are not perfectly correlated due to different investor clienteles, the costs to outsourced funds are likely to be lower than the benefits to distressed inhouse funds. Such type of insurance features are both difficult to replicate in formal contracts and relatively inexpensive to the principal.
Second, a standard incentive contract can diminish the ability of the outsourcing company to sanction the subcontractor by reducing the threat of withdrawing business. Overall, this intuition is not dissimilar from the standard one adopted to justify the use of in-kind remuneration over monetary remuneration. As Prendergast and Stole (2001) argued, monetizing the relationship makes future actions of the principal independent of the past behavior of the agent. This, in turn, implies a reduction in the ability of the outsourcing family to enforce a productive long-term relationship.
These considerations suggest that a principal-agent framework (e.g., (McAfee & McMillan, 1986) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1987) , (Kawasaki & McMillan, 1987) , (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991)) would provide the best set-up to understanding portfolio management outsourcing in an international setting. In general, this framework assumes that the agent engages in value creation on behalf of the principal and retains a part of this value as compensation for his efforts. We consider several theoretical predictions of this framework that differentiate it from alternatives models and use them to formulate hypotheses that help us test the validity of our reasoning.
We start with the main hypothesis that predicts a positive relationship between the agent's compensation and his overall performance: higher variable compensation reduces the incentives of the agent to shirk. Shirking is more destructive to the principal the greater the moral hazard of the agenti.e. the difference between the agent's performance under an incentive contract and that under a fixed compensation contract. 5 If the agent possesses superior ability to generate performance, the principal would be more willing to provide high variable compensation to motivate the agent to exert effort. In equilibrium, the principal-agent framework posits the existence of a positive relationship between moral hazard, performance, and compensation. While the first component is unobservable, the relationship between the other two can be directly tested. High compensation granted to the agents provides proper incentives for the agents to work and results in a positive relationship between compensation and overall performance of the agent. In our empirical testing, subsidization is the chosen form of variable compensation and as such should be associated with higher returns earned by the subcontractor across all his portfolios. This leads to our our first hypothesis:
H1: Subsidization is positively related to the TNA-weighted average return of all the funds run by the management company.
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Another important parameter in the principal-agent model is the uncertainty of the agent's effort.
The model predicts that the share of profits appropriated by the agent should be lower the more uncertain his production technology. Given that uncertainty makes it difficult for the principal to monitor and properly identify the effort of the agent, it leads the principal to choose lower levels of compensation. In our empirical setting, the principal's inability to observe the agent's technology is assumed to be increasing in the (geographical) distance between the mutual fund family and the subcontractor management company -more specifically, if they are located in different countries. It is natural to believe that where the two parties form a cross-border relationship, the principal is unlikely to have access to the information set of the agent and therefore is unable to evaluate the agent's effort accurately. Accordingly, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows:
H2: Subsidization is lower if the fund family and the management company are located in different countries.
Finally, we consider an extension of the standard principal-agent framework to account for multiple tasks and multiple principals. We rely on the literature on exclusive dealings (e.g., (Martimort, 1996) , (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998) ). Using the example of an exclusive contract between a manufacturer and a retailer, (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998) show that an exclusive relationship is an efficient contracting device. In a related work, (Martimort, 1996) shows that incentive issues are sufficient to explain the existence of exclusive dealing arrangements. In our setting, the fraction of the effort that the principal allows the agent to exert for the benefit of other principals should be related to the agent's variable compensation. This reasoning is based on the intuition that if the agent's value function is closely tied to the principal's profits -i.e., the agent's variable compensation is high -he is less likely to disperse his efforts elsewhere even if he serves multiple principals. On the other hand, if the relationship between the agent and the principal is exclusive -e.g., the principal is the biggest and the most important client -the principal can ensure the agent's best effort without resorting to high compensation. In equilibrium, we should observe a negative correlation between the agent's variable compensation and the degree of exclusivity of his relationship with the principal. In our empirical setting, we consider a measure of exclusivity of the principal-agent relationship. We therefore formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
H3: Subsidization is negatively related to the degree of exclusivity in the family-subcontractor relationship.
It is interesting to note that we can provide two alternative interpretations of hypothesis H3, both based on extensions of the traditional principal-agent framework. The first is related to the disciplining role of long term partnerships. (Holmstrom & Roberts, 1998) consider evidence from the Japanese market and point out that "the long-term, repeated nature of the interaction matters.
Although supply contracts are nominally year-by-year, the shared understanding is that the chosen supplier will have the business until the model is redesigned… The familiar logic of repeated games, that future rewards and punishments motivate current behavior, supports the on-going dealings". The disciplining role of the long-term relationship is also considered in (Taylor & Wiggins, 1997) . In the context of the current study, exclusivity likely proxies for a sustained long-term relationship between the principal family and the agent company. In such a relationship, the agent is less likely to renege on his obligations even if his variable compensation component is low.
The second interpretation of hypothesis H3 is related to the concept of market thickness (e.g., (McLaren, 2000) , (Grossman & Helpman, 2002) , (Grossman & Helpman, 2005) ). A thicker market increases the ease with which an independent final-good producer can match with a producer of a specialized input and hence reduces the advantage of vertical integration over outsourcing. In our setting, the market is thick for the agent if he can replace one principal with another. However, if the agent's business is highly dependent on a single principal who cannot be replaced, his hold-up problem is severe. In this case, the agent is likely to exert his best effort even without being properly motivated by the profit sharing arrangement.
In our final hypothesis we consider conditions that increase the effectiveness of subsidization as a profit-sharing arrangement. Since the agent management company does not reap all the benefits of its effort in managing outsourced funds but has to share them with the principal, managing outsourced funds can be seen as a second best choice for the agent. On the other hand, the agent can benefit from establishing a subcontracting relationship since it gains access to the principal's distribution network and can save on distribution expenses. However, this effect is likely weaker if the agent company possesses an effective distribution network of its own. In this case, the principal wields less power over the agent and has to increase compensation to incentivize proper effort. We summarize these arguments in our fourth hypothesis:
H4: Subsidization is positively related to the management company's ability to market and distribute its funds to investors.
Before moving to the empirical findings, we describe the data and the main variables we will use.
II. Data and Main Variables
We begin by distinguishing between the two major types of fund management status: funds that are managed and marketed by the same financial group and funds that are managed on behalf of other financial holdings. The former are defined as "inhouse", while the latter are defined as "outsourced".
To clarify our labeling, we refer to the asset management company that is in charge of managinthe portfolio of the fund as the "management company" and the one in charge of marketing and distribution as the "fund family". For all inhouse funds, the management company and the fund family are the same or related entities.
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A. Data and Sample
We draw our data from different sources. The information on fund holdings comes from the Factset/Lionshares database 6 that reports security-level holdings both for mutual funds and a large variety of other entities, such as insurance funds, closed-end funds, and pension funds. This data allow us to identify the management company for a given investment vehicle as well as the ultimate parent organization to a given company. For each vehicle and each half-year period (January to June or July to December), we consider a semi-annual portfolio by taking the last available portfolio report for that vehicle in that period. 7 We use this information to construct our holdings-based variables described below.
We focus on open-end actively managed equity funds. For each such fund we compute its U.S.-dollar value position in a given security as the total value of the fund portfolio calculated as the sum of individual stock dollar value positions.
To obtain data on fund performance, we match Factset/Lionshares to the Morningstar Direct mutual fund database 8 , section Global Open-End funds. Since there is no common identifier to both datasets, we match funds via an automated string matching procedure which we verify and complement by visual checks. Morningstar Direct also contains share class-level data on net assets, flows, and expenses as well as portfolio-level data on fund style classification. We use the variable "global category" as our major style metric. This metric categorizes fund styles by geography (e.g., U.S., Europe, Asia ex. Japan, etc.) as well as size (e.g., Large Cap versus Mid/Small Cap). Our main sample contains 27 different styles based on the global category classification. Large markets are often covered by multiple styles (e.g., U.S. Large Cap and U.S. Mid/Small Cap), smaller markets may be grouped in one style (e.g., Japan Equity), and yet other styles group multiple countries (e.g., Emerging Market Equity, Asia ex. Japan Equity, Europe Equity Large Cap). The largest 10 styles (by the number of funds) and their characteristics are listed in Panel D of Table 1 .
To construct our final sample, we apply a set of filters. In particular, we focus on open-end funds classified as "Equity" in Morningstar Direct with total-net assets (TNA) greater than 5 million U.S.
dollars. To compute measures of fund historical performance, we require a history of at least 24 monthly return observations. We further exclude funds managed by commercial banks. We do so in light of the evidence in the prior literature (e.g., (Massa & Rehman, 2008) ) that has identified various organizational pressures stemming from the bank's lending activity. Given our research question, we want to ensure that funds in our sample are not affected by such pressures. 
B. Variable Definitions
In order to identify the fund management status (inhouse or outsourced), we exploit the different viewpoints adopted by the Factset/Lionshares and the Morningstar Global databases.
Factset/Lionshares reports the management company of a given investment vehicle whereas
Morningstar reports the fund family. We proceed as follows. First, for each fund, we check whether the name of the management company in Factset/Lionshares corresponds to the name of the family in
Morningstar. If this is the case, we classify the fund as inhouse. If not, the fund is an outsourced candidate. Second, we use the entire organizational structure of the Factset/Lionshares database to identify related entities with different names. In particular, since Factset/Lionshares reports the pinnacle of the financial group that every management company is a part of, we check if the fund family corresponds to any of the associated subsidiaries that are connected to the ultimate parent of the management company in question. This further reduces the number of outsourced candidates.
Finally, for the remaining candidates, we perform a web search to determine whether the management company and the fund family are related. We browse the company websites, the websites of ultimate parents and, if possible, the management company announcements or annual reports. If we cannot find any evidence that the two companies are related, we classify the fund as outsourced. fund do not feature in our analysis. Our major variable of interest is , which equals 1 if fund was managed by an external management company at the end of period , 0 if it was managed inhouse, and missing if the management status for that fund in that period cannot be established.
For every fund in our sample, we construct several performance measures. Using Morningstar Direct data we define fund gross-of-fees return in a given month as the TNA-weighted average of gross returns of the fund share classes. To calculate the excess gross return, we subtract the risk-free 13 rate. 9 We also apply the standard factor-based risk correction methodology. Specifically, we build a set of international Fama-French-Carhart factors as follows. For every country in the Worldscope database, we download stock returns as well as market and book value of equity of all firms and construct country-level market, size, value, and momentum factors following the methodologies of (Fama & French, 1993) and (Carhart, 1997) . For every fund, we estimate two sets of factor models:
style-specific factor models and global factor models.
The style-specific factor model relies on style factors defined over the set of countries in which funds in that style predominantly invest. This set is defined to comprise all countries that consistently attract at least 75% of the average fund's country allocation in the style. We term this set of countries the "Investment Focus" of the style. The last column of Panel D of Table 1 shows the investment focus composition for the top 10 styles in our sample. For example, funds in "Global Equity Large
Cap" invest mostly in the U.S., Japan, UK, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, whereas funds in "US Equity Large Cap" invest in U.S. stocks only. Style-specific factors are defined as the valueweighted averages of country factors across all countries composing the style investment focus. The style-specific factor model extends the standard model used in the domestic mutual fund literature in which the performance of U.S.-focused funds is adjusted for risk exposure to the U.S.-based factors.
For example, the performance of funds in style "Europe Equity Large Cap" is adjusted for risk exposure to the European country factors.
( Griffin, 2002) shows that local Fama-French factors are the best in explaining time variation in expected returns and produce the lowest pricing errors, while factor models that rely on global factors or on a decomposition of global factors into local factors and international factors are inferior to factor models with local factors only. Given this evidence, we adjust fund returns using style-specific factors. However, to address concerns that our results might be driven by particular style-sensitive assumptions about the underlying return generating model, we also consider global market, size, value, and momentum factors by taking the value-weighted average of country factors across all countries featuring in our sample. These factors do not vary by style. In unreported results, we confirm that our main conclusions are robust to this alternative specification.
For each fund-period, we calculate the fund one-(three-, four-) factor alpha as the difference between the fund actual gross return net of the risk-free rate over the period and the excess return predicted by the one-(three-, four-) factor model estimated over the past 36-month return history (at least 24 non-missing monthly observations are required).
In addition, we define several fund-level control variables as follows.
, is the log of fund ′ equity TNA (in millions) at the end of period ; , is the log of one plus We also compute the following composition variables for each management company.
), is the ratio of the number of outsourced funds to the total number of funds run by management company in period , while *$ ), is the ratio of the aggregate TNA of outsourced funds run by management company to the aggregate TNA of all funds run by that company in period .
( ℎ ), and *$ ( ℎ ), are defined as one minus the corresponding outsourced ratios. We also define the dummy version of the outsourced TNA fractions as follows: +*$ ), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraction of management company ′ TNA attributable to outsourced funds is above median in the sample and 0 otherwise.
C. Descriptive Statistics
We start by providing some descriptive statistics on our sample. As of December 2008, the sample contains 2710 distinct funds, 648 (24%) of which are classified as "outsourced" and 2062 (76%) of which are classified as "inhouse" (Table 1 , Panel A). While the sample size increases three-fold over our sample period, the fraction of outsourced funds remains fairly stable, reaching a minimum of 23% in 2007 and a maximum of 28% in 2002. Our sample composition of outsourced and inhouse funds is comparable to that in (Chen, et al., 2010) , where 27% of funds are outsourced, and in (Guercio, et al., 2010) , where about 18% of funds are outsourced (in 2002), and is somewhat higher than in the samples of (Duong, 2009 ) and (Cashman & Deli, 2009) , where 13%-14% of funds are outsourced.
However, these earlier studies are based on the universe of U.S. domestic mutual funds whereas we consider a global sample of funds with different investment styles.
In Panel B of Overall, our sample appears comparable to that used for the US market by (Chen, et al., 2010) who report similar descriptive statistics and differences in size, age, and returns as well as similarities in expenses.
In Panel C of Table 1 , we report summary statistics at the management company level. The average management company manages about 5.6 billion USD in total mutual fund assets and runs 4.9 mutual funds, 3.7 of which are inhouse and 1.2 are outsourced. In other words, about one third of the average management company's assets or funds are managed in an outsourcing relationship.
These numbers are also comparable to (Chen, et al., 2010) who report similar statistics albeit from the perspective of a fund family. For a large part of our analysis, we focus on management companies that manage both inhouse and outsourced funds. We refer to them as "mixed management companies".
Columns 3 and 4 of Panel C in Table 1 and expense ratio of each style. In column 6, of the panel we also report the fraction of outsourced funds in the style for which the management company and the fund family are located in different countries -i.e. where a cross-border outsourcing relationship is formed. The last column of the panel displays the set of countries that comprise the "Investment Focus" of each style as described above.
Our sample consists of funds with different investment mandates. As expected, the U.S. and
European styles are the largest while the emerging markets are represented by smaller styles. We also note that there is some cross-sectional variation in the intensity of outsourcing across styles, suggesting different motives to outsource depending on the investment mandate. In this paper, we do not investigate drivers of outsourcing decisions but leave this question for future research. Fund size, management company size, and average expenses also differ across styles. International funds tend to be smaller than U.S.-domiciled funds. In our regressions, we therefore control for observable fund characteristics with control variables as well as unobservable style characteristics via fixed effects.
16
IV. Outsourcing and Performance
In this section, we focus on the difference in performance between inhouse and outsourced funds and link it to a deliberate effort by management companies to channel performance towards their own brand of funds.
A. Preliminary Evidence
We start by documenting differences in performance as a function of the fund management status. We estimate regressions of fund performance measures on the dummy variable indicating whether the fund is outsourced. More specifically, we run the following panel regression at monthly frequency:
where indexes funds and # , is the set of control variables defined in Section III. We present alternative specifications with different dependent variables % , as well as different treatment of fixed effects for the funds' style and management company .
We report the results in Panel A of Table 2 . We consider the entire sample of funds. Columns 1-3 present models that control for observable fund characteristics as well as time and style fixed effects.
As performance measures, we use excess returns as well as 1-factor and 4-factor alphas. All the performance measures are based on fund gross returns before fees and expenses, although we control for the expense ratio in all specifications. The results indicate that outsourced funds underperform inhouse funds by about 4.5 basis points (bp) per month in excess return (this translates into the annualized performance difference of 0.54%). The findings are similar for the risk adjusted performance measures -e.g., outsourced funds underperform inhouse by 3.7 bp per month (0.44% annualized) in terms of the 4-factor alpha.
The point estimates double after the inclusion of management company fixed effects (columns 4-6 of the same panel). Controlling for the performance variation across companies, outsourced funds underperform inhouse by 9.2 bp (7.0 bp) per month in terms of excess return (4-factor alpha). This translates into the annualized performance differential of 1.10% (0.84%) or about 50%-75% of the fund annual expense ratio. In specifications 4-6, the dummy captures withinmanagement company variation in fund performance as a function of the fund management status.
The strength of the results suggests that the difference in performance between inhouse and outsourced funds is largely driven by their unequal performance in mixed management companiesi.e. those that manage both inhouse and outsourced funds simultaneously. To capture this effect directly, we restrict the analysis to mixed management companies. The results are reported in Panel B.
As before, we find significant differences in performance between inhouse and outsourced funds:
outsourced funds in mixed companies underperform their inhouse counterparts by 9.5 bp (7.1 bp) a month or 1.14% (0.85%) per year in terms of excess return (4-factor alpha).
These preliminary results indicate that inhouse funds enjoy more favorable treatment than outsourced funds. The fact that the performance differential is largely driven by within-company effects suggests a transfer of wealth from one group of funds to the other. This argument, however, requires a formal test of cross-subsidization. This is the topic of the next section.
B. Evidence of Cross-Subsidization
Cross-subsidization has been studied in corporate finance in the context of value destruction within diversified conglomerates (e.g., (Chevalier, 2004) ), business groups (e.g., (Bertrand, et al., 2002) ), and mutual funds (e.g., (Gaspar, et al., 2006) ). We borrow the methodology used in these studies and employ a matching sample approach.
Asking whether performance is channeled from the outsourced funds to the affiliated inhouse funds is akin to asking whether the observed difference in performance between the two funds can be systematically related to the fact that they are managed in the same company. We therefore compare the performance of each inhouse fund to that of all the outsourced funds testing whether the difference in performance can be attributed to the common affiliation of the funds. In other words, do we observe a generic superior performance of all the inhouse funds vis-à-vis all the outsourced or can we identify this performance differential as a management company-related phenomenon?
We proceed as follows. Let us consider all inhouse funds "IF" run by mixed management companies. For every such fund, we identify the outsourced funds that belong to the same management company ("OA" or "outsourced affiliated"). Then, we identify a matching fund for each of these outsourced funds from the control group that consists of outsourced funds that are managed by companies without inhouse funds. For every outsourced fund, we identify the matching fund as the fund from that group that belongs to the same investment style and is closest to the fund in focus in terms of fund TNA. We assume that these matching candidates are subject to any general conflicts arising from an outsourcing relationship but are not subject to the within-firm subsidization effect as there are no inhouse funds present in their management companies. Consequently, they constitute an appropriate control group to test for subsidization. We denote these matched funds "OM"
("outsourced matched").
Next, for every inhouse-outsourced fund pair, we consider two observations: one where the outsourced fund comes from the same company as the inhouse fund and the other where the outsourced fund is the matched fund. We label the difference in performance between the inhouse fund and the same-company outsourced fund as the "actual performance difference" and the difference in performance between the inhouse fund and the matched outsourced fund as the "matched performance difference". We stack the actual and the matched pairs into a column vector and test whether the "actual difference" and the "matched difference" are significantly different by estimating the following multivariate specification:
(2) + %% 6, , = -. 6, , + -0 # 6, , + 1 (+1 ) ) + 5 6, , ,
where + %% 6, , = % 6, − % , is the difference in performance between the inhouse fund and the outsourced fund (whether actual or matched) at time , while 6, , is a dummy that equals 1 if the two funds in the pair are affiliated and 0 if the pair is a matched pair. To account for imperfections in the matching procedure, we include as a set of control variables for both funds in the pair ( # 6, , ) as well as an indicator variable ( # 6, , ) that equals 1 if the two funds belong to the same investment style. As before, we consider different specifications based on different performance measures and different fixed effects treatments. Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. We focus on the dummy variable which equals 1 for affiliated inhouse-outsourced pairs and 0 if the outsourced fund is unaffiliated with the inhouse fund. In columns 1 to 4, we consider performance differences of all inhouse-outsourced pairs while in columns 5 to 8 we only consider the subset of pairs where the inhouse and the outsourced funds are from the same investment style. The results confirm and strengthen our preliminary evidence. Inhouse funds outperform their affiliated outsourced peers by about 10.1 bp (6.6 bp) per month more in terms of excess return (4-factor alpha) than they outperform similar unaffiliated outsourced funds. Considering performance differences from pairs from the same style delivers the same robust result. Inhouse funds outperform affiliated outsourced funds from the same style by 14.3 bp (6.9 bp) per month more in terms of excess return (4-factor alpha) relative to unaffiliated outsourced funds from the control group.
Overall, these results support the argument that companies in charge of their own brand of funds as well as outsourced funds tend to treat their own brand more favorably, possibly engaging in a performance transfer. We now proceed to test whether this evidence can be reconciled with an equilibrium which accounts for the interests of both the principal and the agent.
V. Is This a Principal-Agent Equilibrium?
A. Subsidization and Management Company Performance (H1)
In Section II, we formulated a set of hypotheses characterizing relationships between the parameters of the equilibrium in the principal-agent framework. In this section we analyze these relationships in order to test the validity of the equilibrium view.
We test hypothesis H1 by relating the subsidization effect to the overall performance of the management company. First, we show that superior performance of inhouse funds is not associated with simultaneous poor performance of the affiliated outsourced funds. Rather, subsidization is associated with superior performance of all funds run by the management company and greater overall value. Panel A of Table 4 To test H1 directly, we calculate a variable that proxies for the overall performance of the management company ( % ) and we use it to explain the difference in performance between affiliated inhouse and outsourced funds. % is the TNA-weighted average of the 4-factor alphas of all funds run by the company. We then regress the performance gap between affiliated inhouse and outsourced funds on this variable. Panel B shows the results of this analysis. In columns 1-4, we report specifications where each observation is a specific pair of affiliated inhouse-outsourced funds. Our findings suggest that the performance differential between the two fund classes is strongly positively related to the overall firm performance. As the firm earns 1% in 4-factor alpha, the performance gap between inhouse and outsourced funds grows by 0.1%, the effect robustly significant at 1% across different specifications.
In columns 5-7, we consider the firm-level analysis in which we relate the difference in average return between all inhouse and all outsourced funds to the management company's performance. In these specifications, all the control variables are aggregated to the firm level and are calculated as TNA-weighted averages of the corresponding fund-level controls. The results confirm the existence of a string relationship between subsidization and management firm performance: for every percent earned by the firm, the difference between average inhouse and average outsourced fund performance grows by 0.09%-0.16%, significant at about the 15% level.
On the whole, the analysis in this subsection shows that subsidization does not represent a simple redistribution of the existing profits but is in fact associated with greater overall value creation. This result is consistent with hypothesis H1, which posits a link between greater compensation in the form of preferential treatment of their own fund brand and agents' ability to deliver performance.
B. Subsidization in Within-and Cross-Border Relationships (H2)
If subsidization were not a mutually agreeable equilibrium outcome between principal and agent, then there should exist sizable frictions which prevent principals from penalizing agents who engage in this practice. In an international setting, such frictions are likely to take the form of information 20 asymmetry -i.e., agents possess superior information about the local market which the principal cannot access -as well as communication and legal hurdles. For example, (Chen, et al., 2010) argue that performance differential persist because fund families find it difficult to extract performance from an outsourcing relationship and enforce discipline on the subcontractor. If this view is correct then the subsidization effect should be increasing in the degree of separation of the fund family and the management company. In particular, it should be stronger if the principal and the agent are located in different countries and are separated both in distance and information.
On the other hand, if subsidization is a result of a tacit profit sharing arrangement, as posited by hypothesis H2, the subsidization effect should be decreasing in the degree of separation. In distant relationships, the principal is not able to evaluate the agent's effort accurately because the agent's investment opportunity set is unobservable to the principal. This increased uncertainty about the agent's production technology prompts the principal to offer lower variable compensation which should result in a weaker subsidization effect as measured by our tests.
To distinguish these alternative hypotheses, we analyze whether subsidization is weaker or stronger in cross-border partnerships between fund families and management companies. We recall that about 20% of the subcontracting relationships in our sample are cross-border (see Panel D of Table 1 ). We define a variable called 8 which is equal to 1 for the inhouse-outsourced fund pairs -both real and corresponding matched pairs -in which the fund family of the (affiliated) outsourced fund is located in a different country than the management company. We then rerun our matching regressions interacting this variable with dummy on the right-hand side.
We present the results in Table 5 . The coefficient on the interaction × 8 is negative and significant indicating that subsidization is less pronounced in crossborder relationships. The magnitude is also sizeable: the interaction estimates imply that subsidization is lower by 50% or more in cross-border relationships relative to within-border relationships. Overall, these results are consistent with the equilibrium view which models subsidization as means of the agent's compensation but is contrary to the firm boundary view that regards subsidization as an unavoidable agency effect.
C. Subsidization and Exclusivity of the Principal-Agent Relationship (H3)
We now proceed to test our third hypothesis which takes into account the fact that agents typically serve multiple principals, albeit deriving different share of their business from each relationship.
Hypothesis H3 posits that the agent's variable compensation should be lower if his relationship with the principal is exclusive and higher if the agent serves multiple principals.
For each management company, we construct a measure of exclusivity as a Herfindahl index calculated across all fund families for which this company manages outsourced funds. This measure captures whether the agent's business (and therefore compensation) is concentrated in the hands of one principal or is dispersed evenly across many principals. The variable is defined as:
The main component of this variable is the ratio between the number of funds managed by fund ′ company on behalf of family % at time and the total number of outsourced funds managed by fund ′ company at time . The exclusivity measure is the sum of the squared components taken across all families that the company serves at time . High # : implies high dependence of the management company on few fund families. For our empirical analysis, we define a dummy variable ' ℎ # : , as 1 if # :
, is above median in the sample and 0 otherwise.
In Table 6 , we present the results of the analysis where we relate our exclusivity measure to the subsidization effect. Specifically, we rerun our matching regressions interacting ' ℎ # :
with on the right-hand side. In columns 1 to 4, we report the base specification. We observe that subsidization is significantly less prevalent in those management companies whose outsourcing business is concentrated. The subsidization-induced performance differential between inhouse and outsourced funds in firms with low exclusivity is about 13.6 bp (8.7
bp) per month as measured by excess return (4-factor alpha). However, this effect is 7.3 bp (4.6 bp) lower for firms from the high exclusivity half. On average, management companies in exclusive outsourcing relationships experience a 50% weaker subsidization effect.
Overall, we conclude that an exclusive relationship between the fund family and the management company serves as a substitute to high variable compensation. This result is consistent with hypothesis H3 and the equilibrium view which regards subsidization as an incentive-based compensation to motivate the agent in a non-exclusive relationship.
D. Subsidization and the Role of Distribution Networks (H4)
When entering a subcontracting relationship, an agent gains benefits of an expanded network and, in particular, access to new clientele via the principal's distribution channels. If the agent does not possess an effective distribution system of its own, he will find the outsourcing arrangement as particularly attractive. In this case, the variable compensation can be lower since a part of it is replaced by the distribution benefits. However, an agent with an established distribution network would require a higher compensation -i.e., higher subsidization. In this section, we investigate the effect of the distribution network on subsidization. We assume that companies that are affiliated with commercial banks -i.e. those where the mother conglomerate controls both the asset management and the commercial bank branches, have a better distribution network. This assumption is plausible since retail banking is the primary channel of marketing and selling funds to the general population.
As before, we employ the matching sample approach and regress measures of performance on the dummy interacted with the variable of interest 8 A %% # , which takes the value of 1 of the company is affiliated with a commercial bank and 0 otherwise.
The results are reported in Table 7 . For risk-adjusted measures of performance, bank affiliation increases the subsidization effect. The result is particularly strong when we include management company fixed effects: the 4-factor alpha differential is 11.6 bp per month for companies affiliated with a bank and is statistically insignificant for companies unable to utilize the bank distribution channel. This result confirms the role of subsidization as an incentive mechanism that can be strengthened or weakened by the presence of other terms in the outsourcing arrangement.
VI. Channels of Subsidization
In the previous sections, we have shown that performance differentials between inhouse and outsourced funds are attributed to the funds' common affiliation and are likely an outcome of a deliberate performance transfer. In this section, we investigate possible channels through which this performance transfer takes place. We analyze cross-trading activity between inhouse and outsourced funds arguing that such trading enhances performance of inhouse funds at the expense of outsourced.
A. The Role of Outsourced Capital
If subsidization takes the form of internal cross-trading, the performance transfer should be easier to implement if the relative size of the outsourced assets to the inhouse assets is big. To determine whether the presence of the sizable outsourced capital in the company enhances performance of the inhouse funds, we perform the following test. First, we define a variable +*$ as equal to 1 if the ratio of the aggregate TNA of the outsourced funds in the management company to the aggregate TNA of all the funds in that company is above median in the sample. Then, we rerun our matching regressions interacting this variable with the main affiliation indicator on the right-hand side.
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 8 . Since all variables of interest are dummies, the results are easily interpretable. The evidence across all the specifications indicates that subsidization is much more pronounced in management companies with above-median levels of outsourced TNA. While in below-median companies the performance difference attributable to subsidization is about 6.0 bp as measured by the monthly excess return, in above-median firms this difference is about 6.8 bp larger, totaling 12.8 bp per month or 1.53% per year. The results hold both for raw and risk-adjusted measures of performance and are significant at the 1% level. For example, the analysis of 4-factor alphas reveals an insignificant subsidization effect in firms with below-median outsourced TNA but shows a significant increase (by 13.6 bp a month) in above-median firms.
B. Cross-Trading between Affiliated Funds
Cross-trading of stocks between different funds in the same company can be an effective mechanism of performance allocation and wealth transfer. Cross-trading can alter performance in various ways.
For example, transactions can be executed at favorable prices rather than be cleared through the exchange at the market price. Also, cross-trading can be concentrated at times when a fund in distress lacks liquidity and requires a counterparty to absorb its fire sales. Prior literature has accumulated evidence that cross-trading with affiliated funds has performance implications (Gaspar, et al., 2006) and (Casavecchia & Tiwari, 2011) .
In this subsection, we construct several proxies for cross-trading and investigate the relationship between these variables and fund performance. We begin by defining proxies for the scaled crosstrading volume as follows. Suppose fund is the inhouse fund in question and B is a set of all affiliated outsourced funds. We regard B as a big hypothetical fund that for each stock aggregates its share positions across all funds in the set. where 8 G,6, is an increase in the number of shares of stock held by fund A over period (set to 0 if fund A decreased its share position in stock over period ) and G,6 , is a decrease in the number of shares of stock held by fund A over period (set to 0 if fund A increased its share position in stock over period ). Analogously, we define a proxy for the cross-buying scaled volume as follows: We also consider an overall cross-trading * ,C, defined as the sum of # ,C, and 8 ,C, as well as $ # ,C, , defined as the difference between # ,C, and 8 ,C, .
To augment the measures of cross-trading between affiliated funds, we also consider scenarios where B comprises all funds outside the management company of fund . These funds represent a control group. If the inhouse fund sold a lot of stock to the affiliated outsourced funds but not to the rest of the market, the control version of # would be low.
In the analysis, we pool affiliated and unaffiliated versions of the same cross-trading variable into a column vector and define variable as 1 (0) In Panel B of Table 9 , we perform an additional test. As in the matching regressions, we condition our analysis on the fraction of the outsourced TNA in the company. We would expect that an increase in the amount of outsourced assets relative to inhouse assets should amplify affiliated trading. Our results corroborate this conjecture: in firms with the above-median outsourced TNA fraction, the level of affiliated cross-trading is almost 30% higher than in firms with the below-median fraction.
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C. Cross Trading and Fund Distress
In the previous subsection, we have established that inhouse funds trade disproportionately more with affiliated outsourced funds than would be expected given the sizes of the parties alone. In this subsection, we investigate how cross-trading activity changes around events when subsidization is of particular value. We focus on the time when the inhouse fund is in distress -i.e. faces steep outflows and needs to liquidate a sizable fraction of its portfolio positions quickly. Having an affiliated liquidity provider can allow the distressed fund to avoid liquidation at fire sale prices and mitigate the immediate performance impact of distress.
To test this conjecture, we define a fund to be in distress in a given month if it experiences outflows of or greater than 5% of its beginning-of-the month TNA in that month. Flows are computed as the standard New-Money Growth variable based on monthly Morningstar TNA and gross-returns:
, where *$ and stand for fund TNA and gross return, respectively. Since the analysis of crosstrading is run at semi-annual frequency, we define a dummy variable + , as equal to 1 if fund was in distress for at least one month during the semi-annual period t and 0 otherwise.
In Panel A of Table 10 , we rerun our cross-trading regressions interacting + with on the right-hand side. Standard control variables are also included but are not reported for brevity. The results indicate a strong effect of distress on cross-selling: during distress inhouse funds increase their cross-selling to the affiliated outsourced funds by about 25%, the effect significant at the 1% level.
In Panel B of Table 10 , we investigate whether a large fraction of the affiliated outsourced capital is particularly helpful for inhouse funds in distress. Specifically, we regress measures of fund performance on the monthly distress dummy, the fraction of the outsourced funds in the management company, and the interaction of the two.
The first four columns of Panel B show the results of the analysis restricted to inhouse funds.
Overall, + has a significant negative effect on performance of an inhouse fund. However, the interaction of + × +*$ is highly positive and strongly significant. While the average inhouse fund from a company with a below-median outsourced fraction experiences a decline of 56 bp (38 bp) in excess return (4-factor alpha) during the month of distress, a similar fund from a company with an above-median outsourced fraction fares much better, declining by only 34 bp (= -58 bp + 24 bp) in terms of excess return and 5 bp (= -38 bp + 33 bp) in terms of 4-factor alpha. At the same time, we can detect no significant effect of the outsourced fraction on performance outside of distress. These results imply that inhouse funds benefit from the presence of outsourced but that 26 subsidization is concentrated at times when inhouse funds face steep outflows and need to liquidate their positions. Combined with the evidence from the previous subsection, these results suggest a liquidity-based mechanism for performance transfer, namely, that inhouse funds are able to dispose of their fire sales assets at favorable prices by selling them to the affiliated outsourced funds that serve as liquidity providers. In columns 4 to 8, we report the results from a symmetric regression where we study whether the presence of a large number of inhouse funds in the company benefits outsourced funds at the time of distress. We do not find any significant evidence of such an effect.
D. Preferential Use of Information
In this section, we investigate whether inhouse funds are likely to receive preferential treatment by being allocated more favorable trading opportunities. Consider a management company that has some information (albeit noisy) about the future movement of the stock price. Liquidity and time constraints make it difficult to execute the profitable trading strategy in all the company's accounts. Instead, some funds may be treated more favorably and allowed to transact in the stock in a timely manner.
To test whether inhouse and outsourced funds' information trades are different, we proceed as follows. First, for every fund portfolio, stock, and the semi-annual period we define a variable 8 ,6, ( ## ,6, ) equal to 1 if fund increased (decreased) its weight in stock over period and 0 otherwise.
We consider all stocks that had a non-zero weight in the fund portfolio at the beginning or the end of the semi-annual period. Next, we compute the correlation across all the stocks in the portfolio of this variable and the future stock return. We define the following variables:
8 , = !! 6∈ E8 ,6, , 6, R. F ## , = !! 6∈ E ## ,6, , 6, R. F, where 6, R. is the return on stock in the period following the semi-annual period . Higher 8 and lower ## signify that the fund anticipated the future price movements better. To measure returns, we consider two future periods. The first is the three-month period beginning immediately after the semi-annual period . The second is the six-month period beginning immediately after the semi-annual period . Then, we estimate a panel regression where the dependent variables proxy for informed trading while the main independent variable of interest is the outsourced dummy.
The results are reported in Table 11 . They show that inhouse funds are more likely to buy before stock appreciation than outsourced funds. Moreover, this effect is much stronger when the comparison is conducted within the same management company (columns 5-8 include company fixed effects)
where both types of funds allegedly have access to similar information. The correlation between buy trades and future stock return is 84% (90%) larger for inhouse funds if the stock return is measured over the three-(six-) month horizon. We find no evidence that either fund type times its sales better:
the coefficients on ## are insignificant in all specifications.
Conclusion
We apply the classical principal-agent framework to study performance allocation in the international mutual fund industry. We document that management companies tend to treat their own brand of funds more favorably compared to funds managed in outsourcing relationships. Accordingly, inhouse funds robustly outperform outsourced funds in both raw and risk adjusted measures.
We explain the persistence of this effect by the existence of equilibrium where subsidization is a form of variable compensation paid by the principal (mutual fund family) to the agent (asset management company). We investigate additional predictions of the principal-agent model and obtain evidence consistent with the equilibrium view. In particular, the subsidization effect is weaker in cross-border relationships where the agents' information set and efforts are largely unobservable. This result is contrary to an argument that subsidization is a product of international frictions which prevent the principal from effectively monitoring the agent and enforcing discipline.
We also find that the subsidization is more prevalent in those companies that experience higher overall returns, consistent with the view that the share of variable compensation is increasing in the agent's ability to generate value. We also observe that subsidization is weaker in companies that form an exclusive relationship with the principal family, confirming the equilibrium prediction that exclusivity and variable compensation are substitute incentive mechanisms. In addition, we document that the subsidization effect is stronger where the agent company possesses an effective network to distribute its own products to investors. In this case, the agent has less to gain from an outsourcing relationship and requires a greater compensation.
Finally, we provide evidence on a channel of possible performance transfer between the two fund classes. We document an abnormal cross-trading activity between the affiliated funds, especially at times when inhouse funds face steep outflows and need to liquidate positions quickly. This pattern indicates that outsourced funds serve as buying counterparties to the inhouse funds. This view is further supported by the finding that performance of inhouse funds is increasing in the fraction of the outsourced capital in the management company, particularly at the time of distress.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics calculated over the main sample. Panel A shows the total number of funds classified as "inhouse" or "outsourced" as of the end of each year in the sample. Panel B shows mean (median) fund characteristics. The underlying variables are defined in Section III of the paper. Panel C shows mean and median characteristics of all management companies as well as "mixed" management companies that manage both inhouse and outsourced funds. Panel D shows summary statistics for the top 10 styles in the sample by the number of funds as of December 2008. "% Outsourced" is the fraction of funds that are classified as "outsourced" in the style; "Avg. Fund TNA", "Avg. Mgmt. Comp. TNA", and "Avg. Expenses" are the averages of fund TNA, management company TNA, and the annual expense ratio within each style. "% Cross-Border Relationships" is the fraction of outsourced funds in the style where the management company and the fund family are located in different countries. Column "Investment Focus of Style" lists countries in which funds of a given style typically invest. Table 2 .
Fund Performance as a Function of Its Management Status
This table shows the results from the monthly panel regressions of fund performance measures on the fund management status. The main independent variable of interest is Outsourced which equals 1 if the fund was managed by an external management company over the period and 0 if it was managed inhouse. In Panel A the sample consists of all qualifying funds while in Panel B it is restricted to funds managed by mixed management companies (those that run both inhouse and outsourced funds). Control variables are defined as follows. FundSize is calculated as the log of the fund equity TNA (in millions) at the end the period; MgmtCompanySize is defined as the log of one plus the total equity TNA of all funds, excluding the fund in question, managed by the management company of the fund in question; Expenses is the annual expense ratio of the fund; NumOfShareClasses is the number of share-classes of the fund; FundHasInstShareClass is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fund had a share-class open only to institutional investors in the considered period and 0 otherwise; FundAge is the time (in years) that elapsed from the inception of the fund to the end of the period in question; CumPast12MReturn is calculated as the cumulative return of the fund over the period of the past 12 months; Volatility is calculated as the annualized standard deviation of the fund monthly gross returns estimated over the period of the past 12 months. All specifications include style and month fixed effects. In addition, columns 4-6 report specifications with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. This table shows the results from the matching regressions in which for every pair of affiliated inhouse-outsourced funds a matching pair is added. The matching pair consists of the same inhouse fund and an unaffiliated outsourced fund that is taken from the control group of funds run by management companies that do not manage inhouse funds. The matching is based on the investment style and size. The dependent variables are the differences in performance between the two funds in the pair. SameMgmtCompany is a dummy that equals 1 if the pair consists of affiliated funds (run by the same management company) and 0 otherwise; SameStyle is a dummy that equals one if the two funds in the pair represent the same investment style and zero otherwise. Control variables are included for both funds in the pair and are defined as in Table 2 . All specifications include time fixed effects. In addition, columns 4 and 8 report specifications with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
ALL PAIRS SAME-STYLE PAIRS ONLY (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) The dependent variables are differences in the performance variables between the inhouse and the outsourced fund in the pair. The main explanatory variable is MgmtCompanyPerformance calculated as the weighted average of the 4-factor alphas of all funds of the company. SameStyle is a dummy that equals one if the two funds in the pair represent the same investment style and zero otherwise. Columns 5-7 report specifications estimated at the management company level. The dependent variables are differences between the weighted average performance of all inhouse funds and the weighted average performance of all outsourced funds of the management company. Control variables are weighted averages of the fund-level control variables described in Table 3 (unreported for brevity) as well as time fixed effects. In addition, column 4 reports a specification with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
(1) Table 3 . We interact the variable SameMgmtCompany with an indicator variable HighExclusivity equal to 1 if variable Exclusivity is above the median in the sample. Exclusivity is defined at the management company level as a Herfindahl index of the number of outsourced funds coming from each individual fund family divided by the total number of outsourced funds managed by the management company. All specifications include control variables as in Table 3 (unreported for brevity) as well as time fixed effects. In addition, column 4 reports a specification with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
(1) Table 3 (unreported for brevity) as well as time fixed effects. In addition, column 4 reports a specification with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
(1) Table 3 . We interact the variable SameMgmtCompany with an indicator variable DTNAFracOutsourced equal to 1 if the ratio of the aggregate TNA of the outsourced funds in the management company to the aggregate TNA of all the funds in that company is above median in the sample. All specifications include control variables as in Table 3 (unreported for brevity) as well as time fixed effects. In addition, column 4 reports a specification with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level.
(1) where j is the fund of interest, J represents a hypothetical fund that for every stock contains aggregated positions in this stock of all the funds in the comparison set, Bkit is an increase in the number of shares of stock i held by fund k over period t (set to 0 if fund k decreased its share position in stock i over period t), Skit is a decrease in the number of shares of stock i held by fund k over period t (set to 0 if fund k increased its share position in stock i over period t), Pit-1 is the price of stock i at the beginning of period t, and TNAkt-1 is the total net assets of fund k at the beginning of period t. The comparison set J comprises either all outsourced funds affiliated with the inhouse fund j at the beginning of period t or all funds unaffiliated with fund j at the beginning of period t. CrossTradesjJt (NetCrossSalesjJt) is defined as the sum (difference) of CrossSalesjJt and CrossBuysjJt. Trades with affiliated outsourced funds and unaffiliated funds are stacked on top of each and the variable SameMgmtCompany equals 1 if the observation corresponds to a trade with affiliated outsourced funds and 0 if it corresponds to a trade with unaffiliated funds. Turnover is calculated as the total crosstrading dollar volume (P × min(S,B) + P × min(B,S)) scaled by the fund TNA. LogOutsourcedTNA is the log of the aggregate TNA of all outsourced funds in the management company. The other control variables are defined as in Table 2 . In Panel A we estimate the main specification. In Panel B we interact the variable SameMgmtCompany with variable DTNAFracOutsourced, defined as in Table 4 . All specifications include control variables (unreported for brevity in Panels B and C) as well as style and month fixed effects. In addition, columns 5-8 report specifications with management company fixed effects. T-statistics (given in parentheses) are calculated from standard errors clustered at the inhouse fund level. *** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1% / 5% / 10% level. This table shows the results of the analysis of fund cross-trading and performance as a function of fund distress. A fund is considered to be in distress in a given month if in that month it faces outflows equal to or in excess of 5% of its beginning-of-the-month TNA. Panel A shows the results from the panel regressions of the scaled crosstrading measures on distress interacted with the SameMgmtCompany dummy defined as in Table 8A . Distress equals 1 if the fund was in distress for at least one month during the semi-annual period and 0 otherwise. Control variables (as in Table 8 ) are included in all specifications but are unreported for brevity. Regressions are run at the semi-annual frequency and include style and time fixed effects (columns 1-4) and management company fixed effects (columns 5-8). Panel B shows the results from the monthly panel regressions of fund gross-of-fee performance on the monthly distress indicator Distress and its interaction with the inhouse-outsourced composition in the management company. DTNAFracOutsourced (DTNAFracInhouse) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the fraction of the fund's management company's TNA attributable to outsourced (inhouse) funds is above median in the sample and 0 otherwise. The regressions are run separately for the sample of inhouse (columns 1-4) and outsourced funds (columns 5-8). All specifications include control variables (defined in 
